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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NlW ADMINISTRATION
Speech of Senator Mike Mansfi~ld (D., Montana) to b~
Duquasne University La>J Alumni Banquat
Monday, April 24, 1961
8 p.m.
Pittsb ~ rgh, Pennsylvania

dzliv2r~d

at the

Tha responsibility for the conduct of our relations with
other nations

r~sts

only t1ith the Administration in poHer.

The

President ass umes this responsibility uhen he tak.:!s offica on January
20th. But foreign policy does not com9 to an end with ona Administration and begin anew with the next.
four years.

The slate is not wiped clean avary

There is a continuity of the problems ,,hich confront the

nation fro,n abroad and a continuity of the responses of O•' r govarnment
to these problems from one Ad,ninistration to another.
This is not to say that a

partic ~ lar

Administration will not

stamp tha course of foreign policy with the brand of its own ideas.
The process, however, is a slow ona.

It is

slo~

partly bacausa the

problems which we fac a abroad are not of our exclusiva creation and ,
hence, are not a menabla to our axclusiva remedias.
slm~

And, partly, it is

because the impact of the ideas of a new Administration must per-

meate a large and camp l 9x bureaucracy
they make
dirac ted.

thems~lves

~vi thin

o 1r o-..m government before

felt in action on the problems to ,,hich they are

·.
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We can grasp the significance of this continuity in fore ign
policy by reference to recent events in Cuba and in Laos.

In the one

instance, Presi dent Kennedy had urged an Alliance for Progress of all
the American Republics.

Within this concept, he presented a broad and

cohesive outline for a cooperative advance in the relations of the
nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The presentation was wel l -received

by other Republics of the Americas.

New vistas of common benefit were

opened by it.
Nevertheless, within ninety days of the President's taking
office we were not yet at the beginning of this peaceful advance but
rather face-to-face with a military crisis in Cuba brought about by
the launching of an invasion of anti-Castro forces.

Instead of being

in a position to move forward on a new constructive approach to all of
Latin America, the Administration was compelled to direct its attention
to a critical juncture in our relations with one nation of the
This juncture was reached during thisAdministration.
the roads leading to it began many months ago.

~egion.

But

The juncture represented

the culminat ion of an accumulation of hostility on the part of Cuba to
this nation and an accumulation of our reaponses to that hostility .
On the other side of the globe, in Laos, somethi ng similar
has transpired.

In fact, this situation had already reached the point

of crisis even before the new Administration took office.

It had reached
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this stage because in preceding years a peaceful land, once remote
from the rest of the world, had been turned into a bone of contention
in the larger clash of ideologies and power elsewhere in the world.
As a result the people of Laos who until recent years had scarcely
ever heard a shot fired in anger found themselves the focal point
of steadily converging military forces from outside.

Military clashes

in Laos which produced the immediate crisis involved but a handful of
men.

But these clashes opened fissures with large implications for

world peace.
The direct involvement of the Soviet Union in Laos as a
supplier of military aid to Laotian factions was one factor in producing the crisis and a factor of comparatively recent vintage.

But it

was preceded by the involvement of the Chinese-supported North
Vietnamese government for a long time in a similar role.

The sum total

of this outside communist-involvement in the local Laotian situation
and its progressive enlargement is not measurable,

But our own progres-

sive involvement will give us some insight into the process by t11hich
the Laotians were plucked from the obscurity of remote Southeast Asia
and steadily moved into a focus of world-wide significance.
\.Jhen I first visited Laos in 1953, there were only 2 American.
junior officials in the entire country. There was no aid program to
and,
speak of/ may I add, no Laotian army to speak of, to aid. But
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seven years later, by the time the Laotian crisis broke in full force
in the very last days of the Eisenhower Administration, there were in
Laos hundreds of

u.s.

officials of several agencies and departments.

We had expended hundreds of millions of dollars on aid, largely for
military purposes.
soldiers.

We had financed the training of thousands of Laotian

And, finally, our own naval and other forces had converged in

the general vicinity of Laos because of the steady advance of communistoriented Laotians in the country.
not unlike tha.t cf

th~

This vast commitment of our resources,

Cotm!'unists, had little to do with either the needs

or realities of the situation in Laos.

It had much to do with winning

hollow propaganda victories in the cold war.
To this situation, too, President Kennedy brought new ideas.
In specifics he worked with the United Kingdom and India in an effort
to bring about a cease-fire and the neutralization of Laos.
words, he sought to take Laos out of the cold war.

In other

Left to their own

devices, the Laotian people would ask for nothing more.

From the point

of view of the great powers this solution would mark a significant step
towards a more rational world situation, one which anyone of them could
take in the interests of peace with little, if any, sacrifice of significant
national interests.

-s The initial Soviet reaction to this proposal seemed favorable
enough.

Nevertheless, in the uorking out of the details through the

existing channels of diplomacy, >veeks of delay have ensued.
All the vrhile, professions of the desire for peace in laos
have continued and all the vhile, the fighting has continued in that
country.

All the ••hile, the jockeying for some assumed advantage has

gone on by much the same responses with which this situation has been
dealt for years .
The crises in laos and Cuba reveal vividly the continuity
of both the prcblems and responses in foreign policy and the difficulties of altering either overnight.

~li thout

vishing to

downgrade the

seriousness of either situation, I must emphasize, however, that they
are but a fractional part of a larger picture.

Behind Cuba stands the

vast panorama of continuing difficulties and a continuing inadequacy
of response to them vrith respect to all of latin America .

Yet this far

more significant picture can be overlooked in a fixation on the sensational developments >rithin the troubled island just ninety miles off
our shores.

~.Je

for tvro years .

have managed to live vri th a militantly hostile Cuba
I do not believe vre could live very vell for two days

with a militantly hostile latin knerica.
Yet, vrhat has happened in Cuba under Castro can occur in
other latin American countries.

The seed of Castroism is compounded

of ruthless totalitarian technique plus messianic indigenous leadership,

-6-

plus support from outside this Hemisphere.

It is doubtful that this

seed can grow except in the soil of social and economic discontent.
Unfortunately such soil covers much of Latin America, from the Caribbean
shores down the great spine of the Andes.
It is at least conceivable that this Hemisphere can be insulated
from
from a flow/without of material support to totalitarian forces within
but the task •..;rould be immensely diffi.cult and costly and of only limited
efficacy.

It is not conceivable, hmo1ever, that in this day and age of

instant and easy communications, this Hemisphere can be isolated from
the transference of totalitarian techniques from elsewhere .

Nor can

the appearance of messianic indigenous leadership in Latin American
countries be forestalled because what is indigenous to Latin America is
by definition beyond the control of this nation.
If it is to our interests--and it is--to prevent the spread of
a divisive

and hostile totalitarianism throughout the Hemisphere, there

is one point at which a check may be feasible.

That point is where a

cooperative effort with others renders the soil of the Americas infertile
to the seed of totalitarianism before it takes root.

And in substance,

that is the idea which the President expressed in such comprehensive
form a few weeks ago in his speech on an Alliance for Progress in the
1-Jestern Hemisphere,

It is one thing to advance this idea.

It is another

to bring it to fruition--to promote that economic and social progress
which alone promises the removal of the acids of mass discontent from
the soil of this Hemisphere.
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There \vas much to do .1ith respect to social and economic
conditions in Latin
After the recent

Am~rica

before this Administration took of fica.

d~velopments

in Cuba there is still much to do.

was short when this Administration took over.

Now it may

If the situation in Latin America is to ba
will no longzr

provid~

Presid~nt

even shorter.

so that it

an incubus for totalitarianism then a great effort

m-Jst be made along the lines of thz
the

altar~d

b~

Time

allianc~

for progress proposal \vhich

has advancai and that effort mJst

form in the very near futu·:e.

b~gin

to take concrete

The effort, moreovar, must be a coopera-

tive one because the stake of Latin Americans is far greater and more
direct than our mvn and, in great part, the situation is amenable to
change only as Latin Americans are tJilling to change it,

But if

th~y

are willing to do what must be done for freedom and progress within
their own countries, then the stake of this nation in the future of this
He 1isphere is S'JCh that we must
effort.

b~

prepared to join with them in the

I knmv that the President is so prepared.

also prepared?

Are the rest of •J s

If wa, no lass than the Latin Am2ricans, are willing to

face the dimensions of the difficulties and act in concert on
the President's ideas of an Alliance for Prograss can be and
terpret~d

into effective action.

th~m,

~•ill

than

b e in-
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Not unlike Cuba, the crisis in laos is but the visible ti:p of
a vast iceberg involving the mainland of i'lestern Asia.

It is not only

in laos that the conditions of peace do not yet 0xist.

We may see them,

there,now in striking form..

But if we look beneath the tip, vre will

see that the difficulties Hhich confront us, particularly, fork out from
laos into Thailand and even more so into Viet Nam.
the sea off Southeast Asia.

Nor do they and at

The conditions of peace in any reliable sense

do not exist at Formosa or in Korea any more than in Viet Nam or laos.
In all of these situations, the new Administration begins with what may
best be described as the response of the holding action.

Such stability

as exists in them, in part, is knitted together with huge aid-programs
of one kind or another, backed >-ri th a heavy deployment of our own military
forces in the general area.
At best, these situations will remain uncertain for some time
to come.

At best, the response which vre have heretofore given to them

will have to be continued for some time to come .

It is not yet clear to

1·rhat extent these situations can be altered in the direction of a more
durable and :!.ess costly peace by more effective diplomacy but I am confident that the President vill not hesitate to bring to bear nevr ideas
to that

end.

We shall not knmr the possibilities until ideas have been

tested and, I may add, that this testing has already begun in laos.
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It will be a cautious process--this testing--because the
Presidant is a prudent man who has uppermost in mind the security of this
nation.
forth.

It will be a slow process for reasons which I have already set
But if it is possible to achieve a more stable and less costly

peace in the Far East, I know that the President will leave no stone unturned in his efforts to achieve it.
What applies to Latin America and to the Southeast Asia and the
Far East, applies also to Europe and to Africa.

We have been involved

deeply in the problems of the former for a long time.

In the last year

or two we have become involved significantly in the problems of the
latter.

I shall not, today, go into the details of the situation which

confronts us on these cont inents.

Nevertheless, I would point out by

way of example that the division of Berlin and Germany has not disappeared
with the advent of a new Administration.

Nor have the weaknesses in N/30

dissolved merely because we have installed a new President.

Nor have

the Eastern European nations yet obtained that degree of national freedom of
action which permits a full measure of contact with Western Europe , a condition which must prevail if there is to be a sound peace on that continent.
I shell not go into detail, either, en the vastly complicated
problems of trying to bring control over the weapons of mass destruction
and a measure of reduction in the great burden of taxation on our people
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and all peoples vrhich is entailed in billions upon billions of armaments
expenditures.
took office.

These problems vrere complex on the day this Administration
They grow more complex as each day passes

~vi thout

the be-

ginnings of a solution.
As with Latin America and Southeast Asia, the President may be
expected to bring to bear new ideas on all of these problems of foreign
policy which he inherits.

Indeed, some ideas already have been initiated.

The process of making these ideas effective, however, is, as I have already
noted, at best a slow one.

After years of close observation, moreover, I

am .personally persuaded that the machinery of this process vri thin the
Executive Branch of this government has grown so cumbersome and ineffective
that there is grave danger to the principle of responsible leadership by
the President.

I would hope, therefore, that this A&ninistration would

proceed promptly to a thorough overhaul of the machinery of intelligence
which functions in many Departments and Agencies in a fashion which deeply
influences foreign policy and its conduct.
I 1·rould hope, further, that the machinery for the countless
secondary decisions of policy through which the President's ideas and
primary decisions would be thoroughly overhauled and streamlined and
that the preponderant responsibility in these matters 1vould be lodged
where it has not been for many years--in the office of the Secretary of
State.

.

. .....
\

.
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The difficulties which we face in the world are immense.
The responsibility of the President in connection with them are
enormous.

He carries the ultimate burden for all of us-Democrats

and Republicans alike.

He has a right to expect general support in

these matters, a support which must include, may I say, constructive
criticism in matters of foreign policy.
I want to say that he has had that kind of support in Congress
for the first three months that he has been in office.
from Democrats and Republicans alike.

He has had it

I am confident that he has it

and will continue to have it from the people of the U,lited States.

